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I. INTRODUCTION: THE MEASURE OF MERIT
How ought we to select judges? One possibility is that each of us
should campaign for the selection of judges who will transform our
own values and interests into law. An alternative is to select judges
for their excellence—that is, for the possession of the judicial virtues:
intelligence, wisdom, incorruptibility, sobriety, and justice. In an in* John A. Cribbet Professor of Law, University of Illinois College of Law. I owe
thanks to both Loyola Marymount University’s Loyola Law School and the University of
San Diego School of Law for research support of work incorporated in this Essay and to
Mitu Gulati for comments on an early draft.
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fluential and provocative series of articles, Stephen Choi and Mitu
Gulati reject both these options and argue instead for a tournament
of judges—the selection of judges on the basis of measurable, objective criteria, which they claim point toward merit and away from patronage and politics.1 Choi and Gulati have gotten something exactly
right: judges should be selected on the basis of merit—we want
judges who are excellent. But Choi and Gulati have gotten something
crucial terribly wrong: they have mistaken measurability for merit. A
tournament of judges would be won by judges who possess arbitrary
luck and the vices of originality and mindless productivity; the contest would be lost by those who possess the virtues of justice and
wisdom. The judicial selection process should not be transformed into
a game.
In Part II, “What Is Judicial Excellence?,” I tackle the tough problem that Choi and Gulati avoid—the explication of a theory of virtue
for judges. In Part III, “Discerning Excellence,” I discuss how we can
tell whether candidates for judicial office are bad, by which I mean
incompetent, or are truly excellent. Part IV, “The Mismeasurement
of Virtue,” engages the idea of quantitative measures of judicial performance as a proxy for excellence. Finally, in Part V, “Conclusion:
The Redemption of Spectacular Failure,” I argue that Choi and Gulati’s idea is a rare and valuable thing—an idea that is both completely wrong and wonderfully illuminating. One more thing: Choi
and Gulati focus exclusively on the selection of Justices for the
United States Supreme Court,2 whereas my discussion will range a
bit more broadly to include the selection of judges for other courts
and tribunals.
II. WHAT IS JUDICIAL EXCELLENCE?
If our enterprise is judicial selection, the immediate question is,
Who are the best or most excellent judges? Behind that question lies
a more fundamental issue: What is judicial excellence? Stated differently, What makes one judge better than another? Choi and Gulati
largely beg this fundamental question—focusing instead on particular metrics of judicial performance. In this Part, I will say a bit about
why they beg the question and then attempt to remedy this defect in
their work by sketching a theory of judicial excellence.

1. Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, Choosing the Next Supreme Court Justice: An
Empirical Ranking of Judge Performance, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 23 (2004) [hereinafter Choi &
Gulati, Empirical Ranking]; Stephen Choi & Mitu Gulati, A Tournament of Judges?, 92
CAL. L. REV. 299 (2004) [hereinafter Choi & Gulati, Tournament].
2. Choi & Gulati, Tournament, supra note 1, at 300.
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A. The Problem of Disagreement About Judicial Excellence
It may well be the case that there is wide agreement that we
should select excellent judges but disagreement about what counts as
judicial virtue. The problem of disagreement about judicial excellence
is one of the key starting points for Choi and Gulati’s defense of empirical measurement of judicial excellence. Their strategy is to focus
on a few criteria about which we can agree and which lend themselves to quantification. As they put the point:
While different visions of merit may exist, some are more widely
held than others. Few would quarrel with the claim that a judge
who displays productivity, intelligence, and integrity is better than
one who does not.3

And Choi and Gulati readily admit that by making this move, their
proposal would not provide a ranking of judges on the basis of merit,
skill, or excellence.4 Their ambition is more modest—to do better
than the status quo by providing some objective measure of judicial
excellence:
Our simple measures do not provide a perfect metric for judging
skill, but that is not the standard at which we are aiming. The goal
is to demonstrate the availability of a set of objective measures for
which we can easily collect data and analyze and that would better
identify, at the outset, a merit-worthy pool of Supreme Court candidates.5

So far, so good. We have two assumptions. First, there is disagreement about the criteria for judicial excellence, and so we ought to
seek judges who possess those aspects of excellence about which
there is agreement. Second, of those criteria on which there is widespread agreement, only some lend themselves to quantification, and
so a “tournament of judges” should focus on the criteria for judicial
excellence that are measurable.
From a normative perspective, what seems quite odd about Choi
and Gulati’s development of these ideas is that their analysis seems
driven by the availability of data. That is, Choi and Gulati begin with
the question, What aspects of judicial performance can we easily
measure? Only after the measurability question is answered do they
then ask, What qualities of good judging are the readily available
metrics likely to measure? Of course, as a way of getting started, this
method has much to commend itself. If one wants to conduct a tournament of judges, one must work with the data that is available. But
getting started is one thing, and serious analysis is another. For us to
3. Choi & Gulati, Empirical Ranking, supra note 1, at 27.
4. Id.
5. Id. at 29-30.
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take Choi and Gulati seriously, their analysis needs to be supplemented by another step—the specification of the actual criteria for
judicial excellence.
Why is specification of the criteria for judicial excellence necessary? In order to determine whether a tournament of judges will improve judicial selection or make it worse, we need to know how the
easily measurable aspects of judicial excellence relate to those that
are difficult to measure. That relationship is crucial, because there is
no a priori reason for ruling out the possibility that focusing on the
measurable might have the unintended consequence of favoring
judges with serious defects. If a tournament of judges were more
than just pie in the sky and actually began to influence the judicial
selection process, there is the further concern that an emphasis on
measurable criteria as the determinants of judicial selection might
actually make judges and their decisions worse rather than better.
From both the theoretical and the pragmatic standpoints, an answer
to the fundamental normative question—What makes for excellence
in judging?—is essential.
B. The (Mostly) Uncontested Judicial Virtues (and Vices)
Choi and Gulati make an important point when they note that
there is disagreement about the qualities that make for good judging.
In recent years, quite a bit of judicial selection has largely been
driven by the preference of political actors for certain outcomes on
key issues (abortion, affirmative action, and so forth), and hence ideology has played a major role in judicial selection.6 Nonetheless, it
may be possible to identify a set of judicial excellences on which there
is likely to be widespread agreement.
Whereas Choi and Gulati work backwards, from measurability to
virtue, we shall work forwards, starting with the notion of judicial
virtue. By “virtue” I mean a dispositional quality of mind or character that is constitutive of human excellence, and the “judicial virtues”
include both the human virtues that are relevant to judging and any
particular virtues that are associated with the social role of judges.
We begin with an account of those judicial virtues upon which we can
mostly agree—which I shall call the “uncontested judicial virtues,” or
more accurately, “the mostly uncontested judicial virtues.” “Uncontested” in this context reflects the notion that these virtues are based
6. With respect to ideology, judicial selection is arguably a zero-sum game. That is,
pro-choice political actors (especially interest groups that focus on the issue) have little to
gain from the appointment of a pro-life judge who possesses other fine qualities. And vice
versa, pro-life political actors have little to gain from the appointment of pro-choice judges,
even if they have many other virtues. Of course, abortion is not the only issue, but many
such issues cluster together, which makes a simple left-right model of political ideology
useful both analytically and empirically.
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on noncontroversial assumptions about what counts as good judging
and on widely accepted beliefs about human nature and social reality; the qualifier “mostly” reflects the fact that even an account of judicial excellence based on widely shared assumptions will be contested by some.
How can we get at the zone of agreement about judicial excellence? While there is a good deal of argument about which judges are
the best, there is actually an astonishing amount of consensus about
two related questions, Who are the very worst judges? and What are
the worst judicial vices? No one thinks that the best judges are corrupt, drunk, cowardly, foolish, or stupid. This consensus suggests a
strategy for articulating a theory of the uncontested judicial virtues.
Let us begin with the worst judicial vices and identify the characteristics that are necessary to correct those defects. These characteristics will constitute the uncontested judicial virtues.
1. Judicial Incorruptibility and Judicial Sobriety
One judicial vice on which there is likely to be near universal
agreement is “corruption.” Judges who sell their votes undermine the
substantive goals of the law, because corrupt decisions are at least as
likely to be wrong as they are to be substantively correct. Moreover,
corrupt decisions undermine the rule-of-law values of productivity
and uniformity of legal decisions and likewise undermine public respect for the law and public acceptance of the law as legitimate.
Almost anyone with common sense is likely to accept the conclusion that judicial corruption is a vice. If we accept judicial corruption
is a vice, then what is the corresponding virtue? This question could
become complex—because there are a variety of character flaws that
might lead to corruption. One such flaw that may be an underlying
cause of corruption is greed (or pleonexia)—because a desire for more
than one’s share (or entitlement) could lead a judge to accept bribes.
All humans are at risk of mistaking wealth (which can only be a
means) for a final end (something worth pursuing for its own sake).
Some judges may resent the fact that they receive compensation that
is sometimes only a fraction of that received by their peers in private
legal practice—some of whom may be less talented.
We do not need to identify all of the possible vices that could lead
to corruption in order to see that incorruptibility is an uncontested
judicial virtue. There is no real controversy over the proposition that
judges should be disposed to resist the temptations that lead to corruption. We call this disposition the “judicial virtue of incorruptibility,” even if it turns out that this virtue encompasses a variety of particular virtues each of which corresponds to a particular human vice
that could lead to corruption.
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There is another vice that is closely related to corruption but distinct from greed. Judges can become corrupted because their desires
are not in order—because they crave pleasure or the status conferred
by the possession of fine things. Judges, like the rest of us, can be
corrupted by a taste for designer shoes, fast cars, loose companions,
or intoxicating substances. More subtly, a judge could be corrupted
by a desire for the finer things of life, for example, a magnificent
home, the ability to confer lavish gifts upon one’s children, or the opportunity for luxurious travel.
Let us use some old-fashioned terminology and call the vice of disorderly desire “intemperance.” One might argue that intemperance is
a purely private vice—that a judge’s preference for a third cosmopolitan, the latest from Jimmy Choo or Manolo Blahnik, or the company
of good looking youthful companions is her own business and hence
irrelevant to the question whether she is an excellent judge. Of
course, a proportionate and well-ordered desire for such things is
simply not a vice—or at least not an uncontested vice. But a disposition to disproportionate desires for such pleasures can lead to more
than corruption. Most obviously, a judge who is intoxicated (or high)
on the bench is likely to be prone to error. The disordinate pursuit of
less-intoxicating pleasures can also impair judicial performance—by
focusing a judge’s attention and energy away from judicial tasks.
There is a counterargument. It is a common human experience to
have a friend, colleague, or acquaintance who is intemperate but
nonetheless “gets the job done”—and who even performs brilliantly
at times. Who has not encountered the lawyer who is a star by day
but a lush in the wee hours or the friend whose life at work still
holds together despite a drug problem? So, the argument goes, intemperance is not a judicial vice—at least not until it interferes with
the performance of judicial duty. Even if the intemperate judicial
candidate is a disaster at home, her intemperance should not disqualify her from judicial office if she performs at the office. This
counterargument is ultimately unpersuasive. Of course, an intemperate judge can get lucky and “get away with it,” either appearing to
do well or even actually doing well despite disordered desires. But in
such cases “getting away with it” is a matter of luck; an intemperate
judge is simply not reliable. A really damaging misstep is always just
one cosmopolitan away.
The virtue that corresponds to the vice of intemperance could be
called temperance, in the classical sense that encompasses the ordering of all the natural desires. But I propose that we use another term
to refer to the judicial form of temperance. We have a saying that
captures the intuitive sense that judges must have their desires in
order: we say of a temperate human that she or he is “sober as a
judge,” and this suggests that we name this virtue “judicial sobriety.”
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2. Judicial Courage
Fear is one of the most powerful and familiar of the emotions. The
disposition to feel too much fear makes us cowardly; the disposition
to insufficient fear makes us rash. Courage represents a mean between cowardice and rashness. Let’s call the judicial form of this virtue “judicial courage.”
We might usefully subdivide the virtue of courage into two parts—
which I shall call “physical courage” and “civic courage.” That judges
need physical courage in order to be excellent as judges is a lamentable fact in many societies. We have recently been reminded of this
fact by the tragic experiences of federal district judge Joan Lefkow,
who was threatened by one defendant and whose husband and
mother were murdered by a party to another case.7 A judge who
could be intimidated by threats of physical violence could not reliably
do justice in our relatively peaceful society—much less under conditions in which violence (or threats of violence) is even more prevalent, as may be the case where narcoterrorism or ethnic conflict is
pervasive.
Judicial courage has a second dimension. Judges, like most humans, care about their reputations and social standing. Like the rest
of us, judges seek the approval and companionship of their fellows.
So, in addition to physical danger, judges may fear consequences of
their actions that threaten status and social approval. This fear is
dangerous because the law may require judges to make unpopular
decisions. A judge who ordered school integration in the South might
be shunned socially. In societies where the judicial branch wields
significant power in cases involving hot-button issues (abortion, endof-life disputes, and so forth), there will be occasions where doing
what the law requires may be profoundly unpopular. For this reason,
judges need the virtue of civic courage—the disposition to put the regard of one’s fellows in its proper place and to take it into account in
the right way, on the right occasions, and for the right reasons. A
judge with this virtue will not be tempted to sacrifice justice on the
altar of public opinion. A civically courageous judge understands that
the good opinion of others is worth having if it flows from having
done justice and that social approval for injustice is an impermissible
motive for judicial action.

7. Susan Estrich, Now Is a Tough Time to Be a Judge, SUN NEWS (Myrtle Beach), Mar. 25,
2005, available at http://www.myrtlebeachonline.com/mld/sunnews/news/opinion/11226003.htm
(stating that “everyone was shaken up by what happened to the Lefkow family in Chicago, the cold-blooded murder of a judge’s husband and aged mother”); Pam Hartman,
How Anger Turns to ‘Social Rage,’ M OBILE R EG., Apr. 3, 2005, available at
http://www.al.com/opinion/mobileregister/index.ssf?/base/opinion/1112545146171620.xml (discussing murders caused by anger at judges).
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3. Judicial Temperament and Impartiality
Like fear, anger is an emotion both familiar and powerful.8
Judges, like the rest of us, may be hot-tempered or cool and collected.
And, like the rest of us, judges are likely to find themselves in situations where a hot temper could produce intemperate actions. This is
especially true of trial judges, who are given the task of maintaining
order in what may become emotionally charged circumstances. Litigants may ignore judicial authority or act with disrespect. Some lawyers may deliberately attempt to provoke the judge in order to elicit
legal mistakes or “on the record” behavior that displays animus toward a party, which may serve as the basis for an appeal. In the face
of such provocations, a judge with an anger management problem
may “fly off the handle.” Intemperate judicial behavior may lead the
judge to misapply the law or to distort the applicable legal standards
in “the heat of anger.” Moreover, a hotheaded judge may become partial—pulling against the party who is the object of anger and displaying favoritism to that party’s opponent.
Aristotle identified proates, or “good temper,” as the corrective virtue for the vice of bad temper. In the judicial context, this virtue is so
important that we have a phrase that expresses the virtue as a distinctively judicial form of excellence—“judicial temperament.” This
phrase reflects our sense that the virtue of “good temper” is essential
for good judging.
Is judicial temperament also required for judges who do not supervise trials? Appellate judges work in a cooler environment—
provocative behavior by appellate lawyers is rare, although not unknown. The parties to an appellate proceeding frequently do not appear, and if they do, they sit in the audience without any formal participation in the appellate process itself. Some appellate courts proceed almost entirely on the basis of the briefs, dispensing with oral
argument and hence with the opportunity for “live and in person”
provocations. Nonetheless, good temper is essential for excellence in
appellate judging. Appellate judges hear cases in panels or en banc—
which create opportunities for friction among the judges themselves.
Hot tempers can destroy collegiality and, with it, the opportunity for
compromise and mutual understanding. Moreover, even a brief can
elicit anger, and if anger becomes rage, it can have a blinding effect,
depriving the judge of the ability to recognize the merits of an argument or a weakness in the judge’s own conception of the legal issues
in a case.

8. My view of the virtue of temperance has been improved by recent work by Nancy Sherman.
See Nancy Sherman, Aristotle, the Stoics, and Kant on Anger (Mar. 21, 2005) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://asweb.artsci.uc.edu/philosophy/news/colloqPresentations/Sherman.pdf.
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If excessive anger is a vice, then what about its opposite? Is there
a vice of deficiency with respect to anger? The Stoics are famous for
answering this question in the negative; we might say that for the
Stoics, the disposition to feel anger in any circumstances is a vice.9
The contrary view is that proportionate anger serves a valuable function—it alerts us to wrongs and motivates us to respond to them. A
simple way of framing the issue is to ask which character from the
1960s television series Star Trek would make the best judge—
Captain Kirk, Dr. McCoy, or Mr. Spock. Mr. Spock resembles the
Stoic sage—he feels no anger and acts only on the basis of logic; we
imagine Judge Spock reacting with equanimity to even the most severe courtroom provocations. Dr. McCoy is hot-tempered; we imagine
him flying off the handle in response to outrageous behavior by the
lawyer for a greedy corporation. Captain Kirk represents a mean between these two extremes; we imagine Judge Kirk as appropriately
outraged by bad behavior and injustice but nonetheless remaining
“in control,” and responding in an appropriate manner. The virtue of
judicial temperament consists in having appropriate anger—anger
for the right reasons, on the right occasions, and with a clear understanding of the consequences of its expression.
More concretely, when a party flouts the law or disrespects the
participants in a legal proceeding, anger may be appropriate. Such
appropriate anger alerts the judge to the existence of a situation that
must be dealt with. In some circumstances, the judge will properly
display such anger, giving a lawyer, party, or witness a stern warning. When someone persists in bad conduct, sanctions may be warranted; in such cases, giving an appropriate sanction is the right way
to act on the basis of appropriate anger. But judges with the virtue of
judicial temperament will not display their anger by ruling against
an offending party on issues that are close or by exercising discretion
on incidental matters so as to disfavor the anger-provoking party.
One reason that anger is an especially dangerous vice for judges is
that anger can produce bias. For this reason, the virtue of judicial
temperament is closely related to another judicial virtue, “judicial
impartiality.” This virtue is a familiar feature of our conception of
good judging. We want judges to be neutral arbitrators. A judge
should be open to the law and evidence and not be biased in favor of
one side or another. Such impartiality should extend not just to the
parties but should also encompass the causes, movements, special interests, and ideologies that may be associated with those parties.
When a judge takes the bench or lifts her pen to write an opinion, she
9. See 6 PLUTARCH, MORALIA 89-160 (W.C. Helmbold trans., 1927) (reprinting and
translating Plutarch’s essay, On the Control of Anger); 1 SENECA, MORAL ESSAYS 106-355
(John W. Basore trans., 1928) (reprinting and translating Seneca’s essay, On Anger).
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should put aside her allegiance to left or right, liberal or conservative, religiosity or secularism.
It is a mistake, however, to view impartiality as synonymous with
disinterest. The virtue of impartiality is not cold-blooded. This is because the role of judge requires insight and understanding into the
human condition. A good judge perceives the law and facts from a
human perspective. Some facts are hot—charged with emotional salience. Some legal rules are morally charged—engaging our sense of
indignation when juxtaposed with violative behavior. So the impartial judge is not cold-blooded; she is not indifferent to the parties that
come before her. Rather, the judge with the virtue of judicial impartiality has evenhanded sympathy for all the parties to a dispute.
When we say that impartiality is not indifference, we mean that the
virtue of impartiality requires both sympathy and empathy without
taking sides or favoring the legitimate interests of one side over
those of the other.
4. Diligence and Carefulness
Judging is hard work, involving its share of drudgery. Some trials
are long and boring. Some opinions require long hours of research
and even longer hours of careful drafting. The temptation to shirk
this work is accentuated by the fact that judges are not (and should
not be) closely supervised. And the lack of supervision is compounded
in jurisdictions that grant judges life tenure or long terms in office. It
is hard enough to remove a judge for outright corruption; one doubts
that any American judge has been removed on the basis of sloth
alone. But slothful or lazy judges can do real harm. They are tempted
to delegate too much responsibility to judicial clerks, substituting the
judgment of the clerk for the judge’s own intellectual engagement
with the case. Another temptation is to shape one’s decision in order
to minimize one’s own workload. If granting the summary judgment
motion takes a case off one’s docket, the slothful judge might grant
the motion for that reason alone, sacrificing justice on the altar of
expediency.
What is the virtue that corresponds to the vice of sloth? We might
call it diligence. The diligent judge has the right attitude toward judicial work, finding judicial tasks engaging and rewarding. But more
than a good attitude is required. An excellent judge must have an
appropriate “energy level”—a product of both physical and mental
health. The combination of these traits should translate into a judge
who is capable of hard work when hard work is required. Such a
judge will put in the required hours and sweat out the difficult tasks.
Such a judge will not hesitate to make the right decision, even if that
makes more work for the judge. Nowadays, encouraging settlements
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may be an appropriate activity for judges, but a diligent judge will
aim for just and efficient settlements and not for resolutions that
serve the judge’s own convenience.
Carefulness is closely related to diligence. No one can sensibly
doubt that judicial carelessness is a vice. Careless decisions, careless
drafting, careless research—any of these can lead to substantive injustice. Carefulness is especially important in the context of judging,
because excellent judging frequently requires meticulous attention to
details. The lazy judge may shirk the unpleasant task of mastering
the structure of a complex statute or avoid the painstaking task of
making sense of a tangled body of precedent. Likewise, it requires
diligence and care to draft an opinion in which each and every sentence is worded with careful appreciation of the importance of precision and accuracy. An excellent judge has an eye for detail and a devotion to precision.
5. Judicial Intelligence and Learnedness
Can anyone doubt that stupidity is a judicial vice? All humans
need intelligence to function well—but some tasks require more intelligence on more occasions. Judging is the kind of task that almost
always requires smartness and sometimes requires extraordinary intelligence. Both law and facts can be complex. Only a judge with intelligence will be able to sort out the complexities of the rule against
perpetuities or penetrate the mysteries of a complex statute. But
more than intelligence is required. A truly excellent judge must also
be learned in the law, because one cannot start from scratch in each
and every case and because there is at least some truth to the notion
that the law is a seamless web. In terms of the corresponding judicial
vices, stupid and ignorant judges will be error-prone, likely to misunderstand and misstate the law, and unlikely to make findings of
fact that are correct.
The need for judicial intelligence and learnedness is accentuated
rather than diminished in an adversary system. It is true that good
lawyering makes a judge’s job easier; the lawyers can identify the
relevant issues and call the judge’s attention to the best arguments
on each side of those issues that are in dispute. But in an adversary
system, successful advocates will try to make a bad case appear better by deploying sophistry and rhetoric. Intelligent and learned
judges can “see through” the obfuscation.
6. Craft and Skill
So far, our investigation has focused on what Aristotle called the
moral and intellectual virtues. These are dispositions of character
and mind that make for human excellence. Good judging requires
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more than good character and intellectual ability. That is because
judging includes elements of craft, and therefore a good judge must
possess a skill set—the particular learned abilities that are to good
judging what good bowing technique is to archery or good draftsmanship is to architecture. A full account of judicial craft is far beyond
the scope of this Essay, but one particular aspect of judicial craft and
skill demands attention. Excellence in judging (especially good appellate judging) requires particular skill in the use of language. Good
judges must be good communicators. This aspect of judicial skill includes at least two parts—oral and written. It is obvious that trial
judges need good oral communication skills; they must deliver a variety of oral instructions to the various participants in both trial and
pretrial proceedings. Among these, jury instructions are particularly
important. Written communication skills are especially important for
appellate judges in a common law system, because of the doctrine of
stare decisis. Because appellate opinions set precedent, a badly written opinion can misstate the law or state the law in a misleading
way. A really well-drafted opinion, on the other hand, can clarify the
obscure and illuminate the meaning of murky legal texts.
Good communication skills are also important to judges when
they mediate between the parties to a dispute. A skilled judge can
gain the trust and cooperation of the parties—resorting to the threat
of sanctions only in those rare cases where force is truly necessary.
In this way, good communication skills can increase the efficiency of
judicial proceedings, allowing the judge to focus her attention on
those issues and cases where settlement and cooperative processes
are unavailing.
C. The (Mostly) Contestable Judicial Virtues
One advantage of a theory of judicial excellence is that it reveals a
large zone of agreement. For all practical purposes, we can agree that
judges should be incorruptible, courageous, good-tempered, diligent,
skilled, and smart. But these (mostly uncontested) virtues do not tell
the whole story about judicial excellence. Even if we agree in our
judgments about who the very worst judges are—the corrupt, illtempered, cowardly, lazy, incompetent, and stupid ones—there are
strong and persistent disagreements about who the best judges are.
The partisans of Lord Coke may deride the accomplishments of Lord
Mansfield; the admirers of Justice Brennan may be among the critics
of Justice Scalia. This Part investigates the source of these disagreements about judicial excellence.
Once again, my strategy is to examine the judicial virtues. In particular, I shall argue that disagreements about judicial excellence are
typically rooted in two disagreements about the nature of judicial
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virtue. The first disagreement is about the nature of the virtue of justice. The second disagreement concerns the role of equity and practical wisdom. On the one hand, some disagreements about judicial excellence turn out to be disagreements about and within conceptions
of the virtue of justice. On the other hand, further controversies
about which judges are best hang on differences in the understanding of the role of practical wisdom in judging.
Although there are important disagreements about the virtues of
justice and practical wisdom, there are certainly agreements as well.
When stated at a high level of generality and abstraction, these virtues will command near universal assent. Almost everyone will agree
that an excellent judge must be just (rather than unjust) and wise
(rather than foolish). Let’s borrow the concept/conception distinction.10 We might say that there is agreement that the concept of the
virtue of justice is required for judicial excellence, but that there is
disagreement about which conception of the virtue of justice is best
(or correct or most adequate). And likewise with the virtue of practical wisdom—we agree on the concept, but disagree about which conception of equity is the best one.
1. Competing Conceptions of the Virtue of Justice
What does the virtue of justice require? To answer this question,
let us examine two different conceptions of the virtue of justice: justice as fairness and justice as lawfulness. (For short, I will use the
phrases “the fairness conception” and “the lawfulness conception” to
refer to these ideas.) I shall argue that conceptualizing the virtue of
justice as fairness necessitates intractable disagreements about
which judges are excellent, and that the competing conception, which
emphasizes the idea that excellent judges are lawful, opens the door
to agreement in judgments about who is just.
(a) Justice as Fairness
One influential conception of the virtue of justice is premised on
the idea that the just and the lawful are separate and distinct. Of
course, the view is not that all laws are unjust or that no just norms
are law. Rather, the idea is that there is no necessary connection between legality and justice.11 If this were so, then the most plausible
conception of the virtue of justice might be articulated as follows:

10. See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 73-76 (1986); JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF
JUSTICE 4-5 (rev. ed. 1999); W.B. Gallie, Essentially Contested Concepts, 56 PROC.
ARISTOTELIAN SOC’Y 167 (1956).
11. This conception of the virtue of justice bears an affinity to the separation thesis—
a central tenet of legal positivism. Cf. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (2d ed. 1994)
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The Virtue of Justice as Fairness: A judge, J, has the virtue of justice as fairness, V(j-f), if and only if J is disposed to act in accord
with the best conception of fairness, F, in situations, S, where fairness provides salient reasons for action.

One might think that a judge who possessed V(j-f) would ignore the
law altogether, but this is not the case. If this thought were correct,
it would provide the basis for a devastating objection to the fairness
conception—because it would require each judge to substitute her
private judgments about what fairness requires for the duly enacted
constitutions, statutes, and rules. Although I shall not provide the
argument here, it seems plain that this would be a recipe for chaos.12
But a defender of the fairness conception need not admit that a
judge who acted on the basis of fairness would disregard the law entirely. Why not? Because the existence of legal norms will frequently
give rise to considerations of fairness that will transform the moral
landscape, creating salient reasons of fairness that motivate a judge
who has V(j-f) to act in accord with the law. An example may help to
clarify and illustrate this point. Suppose there is a dispute between
Ben and Alice over Greenacre—a vacant and unimproved parcel of
land. The law gives Ben title to Greenacre, which he has purchased,
but Alice has begun to use Greenacre by planting a garden. In the
absence of the institution of property law, it might be the case that
Ben would have no claim on Greenacre—how would he acquire such
a claim without some use or improvement of the land? But given the
existence of property law, Ben would have a claim of fairness, because he has paid for Greenacre and has reasonably relied on the legal institution of property. If this is so, then the law has created a
claim of fairness that otherwise would not exist, and a judge with
V(j-f) would decide in favor of Ben—assuming, of course, that there
were no other circumstances that created an overriding reason of
fairness to decide in favor of Alice.
Nonetheless, the fairness conception faces a formidable objection
because of the role that private judgment plays for judges with V(j-f).
To articulate this objection, we need to highlight the distinction between two questions about fairness—which I shall call “first order”
and “second order” questions of fairness. A first-order question of
fairness is simply the question, Which action is fair given the circumstances? A second-order question of fairness concerns whose judg(discussing legal positivism and the separation thesis, but not in the context of the virtue
of justice).
12. Of course, there may be some theorists who believe that judges do and should act
on the basis of their sense of fairness rather than the law. Moreover, those who adhere to
the radical or strong indeterminacy thesis contend that the law never constrains the
choices of judges. See Lawrence B. Solum, On the Indeterminacy Crisis: Critiquing Critical
Dogma, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 462 (1987).
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ment about first-order questions will be taken as authoritative. Thus,
the question—Given the fact of disagreement about the correct answer to a first-order question of fairness, whose judgment should be
taken as authoritative?—is a second-order question of fairness. One
possible answer to a second-order question of fairness is that one
ought to rely on one’s own private judgment about what action is fair.
A quite different answer is that one should rely on some source of
public judgment. For example, one might rely on duly enacted and
public laws.
The fairness conception implicitly requires judges to exercise private judgment about first-order questions of fairness. In exercising
that judgment, the judge may conclude that expectations generated
by reasonable reliance on the law provide reasons of fairness—as in
the case of Ben, Alice, and Greenacre—but this is a conclusion of private judgment. One judge might conclude that Ben’s reliance on
property law was reasonable and hence that fairness required a decision for Ben. A different judge might conclude that no one could reasonably rely on property law in cases in which they were allowing
valuable land to lie fallow when others could make productive use of
the land—and therefore decide for Alice. Yet a third judge might conclude that because of pervasive economic inequalities, the whole institution of property is unjust and award the land to a third party,
Carla, who was in greater need than either Ben or Alice. Because
each judge makes a private judgment about the all-things-considered
fairness of following the law in each case, these judgments can (and
we expect will) differ with the moral, religious, and ideological views
of the particular judge.
The objection to the fairness conception of the virtue of justice is
that disagreements in private judgments about fairness would undermine the very great values that we associate with the rule of law.
Because the fairness conception requires each judge to exercise her
own private judgment about what fairness requires—all things considered—and because such judgments will frequently differ, the outcome of disputes adjudicated by judges with V(j-f) will be systematically unpredictable. If this were the case, then the law would be unable to perform the function of coordinating behavior, creating stable
expectations, and constraining arbitrary or self-interested actions by
officials. How bad this would be is a matter of dispute. A Hobbesian
answer to this question is that it would be very bad indeed—in the
absence of a coordinating authority, life would be “solitary, poore,
nasty, brutish, and short.”13 A Lockean answer is that reliance on

13. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 76 (Edwin Curley ed., Hackett Publ’g 1994) (1651).
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private judgment leads to “inconveniences,”14 but even an optimistic
realist would surely concede that the inconvenience of a society that
cannot secure the rule of law would be serious.
We are now in a position to apply what we have learned about the
fairness conception to judicial selection. If the fairness conception
were correct, then the excellent judges would be those who have the
right beliefs about fairness and who are disposed to act on those beliefs. If we agreed on the content of the right beliefs about fairness,
this would not be a problem, but we do not agree. So the fairness conception leads to disagreement about who has the virtue of justice. We
can provide a crude translation of this point into the language of political ideologies of the left and right. For the left, only left-wing
judges are just; because only left-wing judges have what the left considers true beliefs about what fairness requires. And, of course, for
the right, the left-wing judges are unjust precisely because they have
what the right considers false beliefs about fairness. Even the uncontested virtues—such as incorruptibility or courage—become problematic once the fairness conception has been accepted. For the left,
an intelligent, diligent, and courageous right-wing judge may be
worse than one who lacks a keen intellect, is somewhat lazy, and is
susceptible to the pressures of public opinion. And for the right, these
same concerns exist with respect to left-wing judges.
Another weakness of the fairness conception is that anyone who
holds it is naturally tempted to apply a double standard of judicial
excellence. The double standard works like this:
For judges with whom I agree, the fairness conception supplies the
content of the virtue of justice. Right-thinking judges are excellent
when they act on the basis of their convictions about what is fair.
But when it comes to judges with whom I disagree, a different
standard applies. Wrong-thinking judges are excellent when they
stick to the rules. For them, the lawfulness conception provides the
standard for the virtue of justice.

You may say that position is ludicrous; no one could hold such a blatantly inconsistent set of positions about the meaning of justice. In
reply, I suggest that you pay careful attention to the political rhetoric
that attends debates about judicial roles and judicial selection.
(b) Justice as Lawfulness
If the fairness conception of the virtue of justice is unsatisfactory,
is there an alternative? In the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle suggests an alternative understanding of justice as lawfulness, but to
14. JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 276 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge
Univ. Press 1988) (1690).
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understand Aristotle’s view, we need to take a look at the Greek
word nomos, which is usually translated as “law.” For the ancient
Greeks, nomos had a broader meaning than does “law” in contemporary English. Richard Kraut, the distinguished Aristotle scholar, explained the difference as follows:
[W]hen [Aristotle] says that a just person, speaking in the broadest
sense, is nomimos, he is attributing to such a person a certain relationship to the laws, norms, and customs generally accepted by
some existing community. Justice has to do not merely with the
written enactments of a community’s lawmakers, but with the
wider set of norms that govern the members of that community.
Similarly, the unjust person’s character is expressed not only in
his violations of the written code of laws, but more broadly, in his
transgression of the rules accepted by the society in which he lives.
There is another important way in which Aristotle’s use of the
term nomos differs from our word ‘law’: he makes a distinction between nomoi and what the Greeks of his time called psēphismata—conventionally translated as ‘decrees’. A decree is a legal
enactment addressed solely to present circumstances, and sets no
precedent that applies to similar cases in the future. By contrast, a
nomos is meant to have general scope: it applies not only to cases
at hand but to a general category of cases that can be expected to
occur in the future.15

We can restate this last point by using our distinction between types
of judgments (first- and second-order, private and public). If judges
rely on their own first-order private judgments of fairness as the basis for the resolution of disputes, then it follows inexorably that their
judgments will be decrees (psēphismata) and not decisions on the basis of a second-order public judgment—in other words, not on the basis of a nomos. A judge who decides on the basis of her own private
judgments about which outcome is fair—all things considered—is
making decisions that are tyrannical in Aristotle’s sense.
How can this be?, you may ask. Are not decisions that are motivated by fairness the very opposite of tyranny? But framing the question in this way obscures rather than illuminates the point. Of
course, if there were universal agreement (or even a strong consensus) of first-order private judgments about fairness, then decisions on
the basis of such judgments would be nomoi and not psēphismata.
But our first-order private judgments about the all-things-considered
requirements of fairness do not agree. So in any given case, a decision that the judge believes is required by fairness will be seen by
others quite differently. At best, the decision will be viewed as a
good-faith error of private judgment about fairness. More likely,
those who disagree will describe the decision as a product of ideology,
15. RICHARD KRAUT, ARISTOTLE 105-06 (2002).
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personal preference, or bias. At worst, the decision will be perceived
as the product of arbitrary will or self-interest. In no event will a decision based on a controversial first-order private judgment of fairness be viewed as the outcome of a nomos—a publicly available legal
norm.
We are now in a better position to appreciate why rule by decree
(psēphismata) is typical of tyranny. Decision on the basis of firstorder private judgments about fairness is the rule of individuals and
not of law. From Aristotle’s point of view, a regime that rules by decree does not provide the stability and certainty that is required for
human communities to flourish.16 Kraut elaborates on this point:
We can now begin to see why Aristotle thinks that justice in its
broadest sense can be defined as lawfulness, and why he has such
high regard for a lawful person. His definition embodies the assumption that every community requires the high degree of order
that comes from having a stable body of customs and norms, and a
coherent legal code that is not altered frivolously and unpredictably. Justice in its broadest sense is the intellectual and emotional
skill one needs in order to do one’s part in bringing it about that
one’s community possesses this stable system of rules and laws.17

And with that point in place, we can now formulate the lawfulness
conception of the virtue of justice:
The Virtue of Justice as Lawfulness: A judge, J, has the virtue of
justice as lawfulness, V(j-l), if and only if J is disposed to act in accord with the nomoi (positive laws and stable customs and norms),
N, in situations, S, where the nomoi provide salient reasons for action.

On the lawfulness conception, the virtue of justice does not require
action in conformity with one’s first-order private judgments of fairness. Justice as lawfulness is based on a second-order judgment that
judges (or, more generally, citizens) should rely on public judgments.
The content of the public judgments are the nomoi—the positive laws
and shared norms of a given community. Someone with the virtue of
justice is disposed to act on the basis of the nomoi. In other words,
the lawfulness conception holds that the excellent judge is a nomimos, someone who grasps the importance of lawfulness and is disposed to act on the basis of the laws and norms of her community.
We are now in a position to compare the fairness conception and
the lawfulness conception. Which of these offers a more satisfactory
conception of the virtue of justice? On the surface, it might appear
that the fairness conception is more satisfactory—after all, who can

16. Id. at 106.
17. Id.
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deny that we ought to do what fairness requires, all things considered? Although there is much more to be said in a full account of
these matters, the argument advanced here provides good reasons to
doubt that the fairness conception can offer a satisfactory account of
the virtue of justice. A view of justice must take into account the distinctions between first- and second-order judgments and between
public and private judgments. Once these distinctions are introduced, the need for second-order agreement on a public standard of
judgment becomes clear. The lawfulness conception of the virtue of
justice answers this need; the fairness conception does not.
2. Competing Conceptions of Equity and Practical Wisdom
But the virtue of justice may not be exhausted by the lawfulness
conception. Even if we concede that in ordinary cases justice requires
adherence to the law, the question remains whether there are extraordinary cases—cases in which excellent judges would depart
from the law (or, to put it differently, decide that the law does not
really apply). Even if first-order private judgment cannot do the work
of filling in the content of a general conception of the virtue of justice,
that does not necessarily imply that the judge’s sense of fairness has
no role to play.
One reason we might doubt the adequacy of the lawfulness conception as the whole story about the virtue of justice flows from the
fact that the positive law is cast in the form of abstract and general
rules; such rules may lead to results that are unfair in those particular cases that do not fit the pattern contemplated by the formulation
of the rule. If lawfulness were the whole story about the virtue of justice, then an excellent judge would apply the rule “come hell and high
water,” even if the rule led to consequences that were absurd or
manifestly unjust. But this implication of the lawfulness conception
seems odd and unsatisfactory. Another way of conceptualizing this
concern is to distinguish between two styles of rule application,
which I shall call “mechanical” and “sensitive.”
Does the excellent judge apply the rules in a rigid and mechanical
way? Or does a virtuous judge correct the rigidity of the lawfulness
conception with equity? The classic discussion of these questions is
provided by Aristotle in Book V, Chapter 10, of the Nicomachean
Ethics:
What causes the difficulty is the fact that equity is just, but not
what is legally just: it is a rectification of legal justice. The explanation of this is that all law is universal, and there are some
things about which it is not possible to pronounce rightly in general terms; therefore in cases where it is necessary to make a general pronouncement, but impossible to do so rightly, the law takes
account of the majority of cases, though not unaware that in this
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way errors are made. And the law is none the less right; because
the error lies not in the law nor in the legislator but in the nature
of the case; for the raw material of human behaviour is essentially
of this kind.18

This is the locus classicus for Aristotle’s view of epieikeia, which is
usually translated as “equity” but can also be translated as “fairmindedness.” As Roger Shiner puts it,
Equity is the virtue shown by one particular kind of agent—a
judge—when making practical judgments in the face of the limitations of one particular kind of practical rule—those hardened customs and written laws that constitute for some society that institutionalized system of norms that is its legal system.19

But there is a problem with supplementing the lawfulness
conception of the virtue of justice with the notion of equity.
Understanding the problem begins with the fact that the virtue of
equity seems to require the exercise of first-order private judgments
of fairness. Once such judgments are admitted to have trumping
force—to have the power to override the second-order judgment to
rely on the public judgments embodied in the law—the question
becomes how the role of private judgment can be constrained.
Without constraint, private judgment threatens to swallow public
judgment, and then we are on a slippery slope that threatens to
transform the lawfulness conception into the fairness conception.
The trick is to constrain equity while preserving its corrective
role. To put the point metaphorically, we need an account of equity
that enables us to navigate the slope while providing sufficient
traction to avoid slipping or sliding. An Aristotelian account of the
virtue of equity gives us three points of traction. The first point of
traction is provided by the distinction between the equitable
correction of law’s generality and the substitution of first-order
private judgments for the nomoi. Equity is not doing what the judge
believes is fair when that belief conflicts with the law; rather, equity
is doing what the spirit of the law requires when the expression of
the rule fails to capture its point or purpose in a particular factual
context. The second point of traction is provided by the virtue of
justice itself. A judge who is nomimos simply is not tempted to use
equity to avoid the constraining force of the law. A nomimos has
internalized the normative force of the law; such a judge wants to do
as the law requires.

18. ARISTOTLE, THE ETHICS OF ARISTOTLE: THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS (J.A.K. Thomson trans., rev. ed., Penguin Books 1976).
19. Roger A. Shiner, Aristotle’s Theory of Equity, 27 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1245, 1260-61
(1994).
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The third point of traction is provided by Aristotle’s
understanding of the intellectual virtue of practical wisdom, or
phronesis—think of the quality that we describe as “good judgment”
or “common sense.”20 A judge with the virtue of practical wisdom, a
phronimos, has the ability to perceive the salient features of particular situations. In the context of judging, we can use Llewellyn’s
phrase, “situation sense,”21 or by way of analogy to the phrase “moral
vision,”22 we can say that a sense of justice requires “legal vision,” the
ability to size up a case and discern which aspects are legally important. The phronimos can do equity because she grasps the point of legal rules and discerns the legally and morally salient features of particular fact situations.
This account of equity can be contrasted with two rival accounts.
On the one hand, we can imagine a conception of judging as pure equity—the idea that the judge would simply do the right thing in each
particular fact situation. This conception of equity is simply a version
of the fairness conception of the virtue of justice. On the other hand,
we can imagine a conception of judging that limits equity to the vanishing point—perhaps to those cases where the application of the
rule is truly absurd. Neither of these two alternatives offers a fully
satisfactory account of the virtue of equity. The first alternative sacrifices the great goods created by the rule of law. The second alternative pays too high of a price for those goods and requires more rigidity than is necessary. A constrained practice of equity done by judges
who are both nomimos and phronimos combines the values of the
rule of law with the flexibility to bend the rules to fit the facts when
that is required by the purposes of the rules themselves.
III. DISCERNING EXCELLENCE
Excellent judges possess the judicial virtues. They are incorruptible and sober, courageous, good-tempered, impartial, diligent, careful, smart, learned, skilled, just, and wise. But how can we tell which
candidates for high judicial office possess these virtues? Knowing
what judicial virtue is is one thing; knowing who possesses the judicial virtues is another. In this Part, I argue that the discernment of
virtue has three components—screening for judicial vice, detection of
wisdom, and recognition of lawfulness.

20. ARISTOTLE, supra note 18.
21. KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 59-61, 121-57, 206-08 (1960).
22. See NANCY SHERMAN, THE FABRIC OF CHARACTER: ARISTOTLE’S THEORY OF VIRTUE
(1989).
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A. Screening for Judicial Vice
The first step in discerning excellence is the simplest. The initial
screen for judicial excellence eliminates candidates who are incontrovertibly vicious—corrupt, ill-tempered, cowardly, unintelligent, or
foolish. Screening for these vices is already a large part of the judicial
selection process. Background investigations, conducted at the federal level by the FBI, seek to ferret out the moral vices. The solicitation of comments by peers (lawyers and judges) is designed to elicit
evidence of more subtle defects in character or intellect.
If we want to effectively screen for vice, we want to select judges
(and especially Supreme Court Justices) from candidates who have a
track record that is likely to expose these vices. This suggests that
Supreme Court Justices ought to be selected from judges or lawyers
who have extensive experience in public life. Serious moral and intellectual defects may not be apparent at age thirty, but they are likely
to have been exposed after two decades in public life. Luck may allow
a cowardly or corrupt judge to flourish without incident for some
span of years, but eventually vice will out.
B. Detecting the Phronimos
Mere absence of the worst vices is not enough. A good judge must
possess the virtue of practical wisdom, or phronesis. Screening for
vice is relatively easy; detecting the phronimos is likely to be both
more difficult and more controversial. Before going any further, however, we ought to be careful not to exaggerate the problem. Practical
wisdom is not an esoteric or mystic quality. Folk psychology recognizes “practical wisdom,” which is frequently called “common sense.”
Our intellectual and literary traditions are full of references to the
wise—from King Solomon to Gandalf. Our ordinary lives involve interactions with friends and colleagues whom we recognize as having
good practical judgment; we ask them for advice and emulate their
choices.23 Practical wisdom is harder to theorize than it is to recognize.
The fact that we are able to recognize practical wisdom offers the
key to the problem of discerning the phronimos. Persons of practical
wisdom, phronimoi, are recognizable by those who know them and
interact with them. This fact has consequences for judicial selection.
The process of selecting judges should rely heavily on the recommendations of those who are in a position to know whether the candidate
possesses practical wisdom.
But this creates a special problem for the selection of Supreme
Court Justices. The ultimate selector is the President, but the pool of
23. See LINDA TRINKAUS ZAGZEBSKI, DIVINE MOTIVATION THEORY (2004).
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candidates is comprised mostly of judges. Given the separation of
powers and the code of judicial ethics, judges may become cloistered—isolated from everyone but their friends and family, judicial
colleagues, and law clerks. Opinions give evidence of craft and the intellectual virtues but provide an imperfect window on the judge’s
practical wisdom. For this reason, it is especially important that
judges—at least those who would be willing to serve on the Supreme
Court—engage in practical activities that expose them to public life.
Civic or charitable activities and service on judicial commissions are
two obvious opportunities for judicial immersion in a public life of
practical activity. Supreme Court Justices should be selected from
among those who have demonstrated their possession of practical
wisdom, both from the bench and in wider public life.
C. Recognizing the Nomimos
If judicial opinions are an imperfect window on the virtue of practical wisdom, they are well suited for the task of recognizing which
judges are lawful and which are results-oriented. Although disregard
for the rule of law can be masked by clever opinion writing, a persistent pattern of lawlessness is truly difficult to conceal. By way of contrast, a judge who is nomimos will strive to stay within the letter and
spirit of existing law. Judges who believe in the rule of law attempt
to give statutory or constitutional language its full due, eschewing
interpretations that create unnecessary or artificial vagueness or
ambiguity. Judges who believe in the rule of law will strive to follow
precedent rather than evade it.
Of course, it might be possible for an ambitious lower court judge
to feign the virtue of justice as lawfulness. But given the relatively
small chance that any one judge has of appointment to the United
States Supreme Court, it seems rather unlikely that many judges
would choose to act as formalists when they are instrumentalists at
heart. Judges with the vice of results-orientation are likely to wear it
on their sleeve rather than conceal it underneath their robes.
In sum, we have good reason to believe that we can screen for
vice, discern the possession of practical wisdom, and recognize true
dedication to the rule of law. The fact that we have the capacity to
recognize judicial virtue, however, does not entail that we can quantify it. A tournament of virtue, on the other hand, promises something that might appear to be a very great good. If we can quantify
indicia of judicial excellence reliably, then judicial selection might
proceed on the basis of objective, publicly available criteria. The hard
question is whether the variables that can be quantified are good
proxies for true judicial virtues.
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IV. THE MISMEASUREMENT OF VIRTUE
Can we quantify judicial virtue? I will argue that the most reasonable answer to this question is “no.” Before I do, however, we
should examine the case for quantification, as stated by Choi and Gulati.
A. The Case for Quantification
Choi and Gulati make the case for measurement by introducing
the distinction between absolute and relative measurement of judicial excellence:
Some will see the search for a set of objective measures as pointless because they think that there is no way to measure or quantify what it means to be a good, let alone great, judge. This is likely
true as an absolute matter. Nonetheless, with a set of candidates
with track records as lower court judges, it may still be possible to
make meaningful relative evaluations. So, just as it is impossible
to articulate what special factor makes Lance Armstrong the best
cyclist in the world, it is impossible to reduce Justice Benjamin
Cardozo’s greatness as a judge to numbers. But one can look at
how many times Armstrong has won the Tour de France and compare his numbers to those of his peers. Similarly, one can look at
Justice Cardozo’s opinions and see how often they were cited by
other judges, how often they were discussed in law reviews, and
how often they made their way into casebooks. Justice Cardozo’s
numbers can then be compared to those of his peers. As with Armstrong, this type of relative analysis does not give us a measure of
his greatness or tell us what made him great. But it gives us a
sense, even if imperfect, of how he performed relative to his
peers.24

In other words, they argue that we can develop an ordinal scale for
judicial excellence, even if we cannot develop a cardinal scale.
Before we go any further, however, we ought to observe that the
analogy that Choi and Gulati make between bicycle racing and judging is a rather tenuous one. In the case of bicycle racing, there is an
objective and quantifiable measure of performance. The first to finish
is the winner; participants in the race are ranked (both cardinally
and ordinally) by time. In racing, the output of the contestants is ultimately the time it takes each racer to finish, which can easily be
compared across racers. In judging, there are many outputs: rulings,
opinions, jury instructions, and so forth. These outputs cannot easily
be compared across cases and judges. There is no scale that permits
objective comparisons to be made.

24. Choi & Gulati, Empirical Ranking, supra note 1, at 30 (footnote omitted).
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B. Measuring the Wrong Qualities
Choi and Gulati’s error extends beyond the obviously fallacious
nature of their analogy to racing. The measures they propose—for
example, citation rates and productivity—not only fail to capture the
essence of judicial excellence, they may, at least in some circumstances, measure judicial vice. Choi and Gulati assume that judges
who write lots of opinions that are cited a lot are better judges than
those who write fewer opinions and get fewer citations. But are these
assumptions correct?
1. Citation and the Rule of Law
Choi and Gulati seem to assume that citation rate correlates with
judicial excellence. Their argument for this conclusion is actually
somewhat obscure. It begins with the idea that there is a “market”
for judicial opinions: “We can look at the frequency with which a
judge’s opinion is used by a variety of consumers (including, for example, citation counts). Because circuit court judges write lots of
opinions, the market test allows us to rank them in terms of the
quality of those opinions.”25 In the accompanying footnote, they explain:
The view of judicial opinions as a market product available for
consumption by judges, attorneys, and casebook writers has historical roots. In the early days of the Supreme Court, judicial opinions were typically recorded and distributed by private reporters.
Reporters such as Cranch and Wheaton, for example, would record
Court decisions, earning a return through private sales of their reports. Indeed, across the Atlantic in England, it was common for
multiple reporters to record the same judicial opinion, competing
against each other based on the quality of the text they provided.26

This passage does not, however, establish that the use of judicial
opinions mimics a market in the respects that would be relevant to
the notion that citation counts measure judicial excellence. The fact
that reporters of opinions compete with each other on the basis of the
accuracy of their reports does not entail that the authors of opinions
compete with each on the basis of the quality of their decisions. Because this claim would be absurd, we can assume that Choi and Gulati did not intend to suggest it, and that the footnote is merely reporting an interesting fact and is not intended to establish the conclusion that there is a market for the excellence of opinions.
Choi and Gulati continue the development of their claim about the
market for judicial opinions:
25. Choi & Gulati, Tournament, supra note 1, at 306.
26. Id. at 306 n.21 (citation omitted).
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Markets do not always work well, however, and when they do
not, they tend to be biased and inefficient. The problems that
plague markets include asymmetric information, unsophisticated
customers, and an inadequate number of producers (leading to oligopoly pricing).27

So far, so good. Choi and Gulati’s next claim, however, is problematic:
Unlike many other markets, however, the market for judicial
opinions is relatively free of such imperfections. For one, judicial
opinions may be obtained at no cost by judges and, in many areas
of the law, are abundant.28

“No cost” is ambiguous. Choi and Gulati are right if they simply
mean that judges do not personally pay a monetary price for access to
law libraries and electronic legal databases. But this does not mean
that the production of citations to other judges’ opinions is cost-free.
Citing is an expensive business, but the price is paid in terms of time.
Finding opinions takes time. Reading them takes time. Citing them
properly takes time. Choi and Gulati obviously know this; they are
legal scholars and personally pay a price for the citations they produce.
The price that judges pay in terms of time is an opportunity cost.
Whether judges research, read, and cite on their own or have their
clerks do this work, the time devoted to this activity is not available
for other activities. Moreover, the time resource is finite. A judge’s
own time is finite; there are only so many hours in the day, so many
days in the week, and so many weeks in the year. Clerk time is also
finite; judges are limited in the number of clerks they can employ.
Typically, this limit is quite rigid, and even if a judge wanted to hire
additional clerks, the judge would not be permitted to do so.29
The fact that citations are costly has important implications for
answering the question whether citation rates measure the quality of
judicial opinions. If citations were free, then one might suppose that
the only variable that would influence the decision of Judge A to cite
an opinion by Judge B would be the quality of Judge B’s opinion. Of
course, there are other variables, such as whether Judge B’s opinions
are binding on Judge A, but let us set those complications aside.
If, however, Judge A’s decision whether to cite Judge B’s opinion
is costly, then quality will not be the only variable. Another important variable will be the costs of searching for Judge B’s opinion. If
Judge B’s opinion turns up early in Judge A’s search for authority,
then it will be more likely to be cited. As we all know, there are many
27. Id. at 306.
28. Id.
29. Some judges do have the discretionary power to hire “externs,” or law students
who perform some of the tasks that clerks do.
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basic propositions of law for which many possible opinions could be
cited. In each federal circuit, for example, there are opinions on basic
procedural matters (standards of appellate review, standards for
summary judgment, and so forth) where hundreds or thousands of
prior opinions will state the proposition of law.
A rational judge will not read all of these opinions and cite the
opinion that does the best job of stating the law. Rather, the rational
judge will read enough authority to be reasonably sure of the correct
statement of the rule. When it comes to citations, we would expect
judges to “satisfice” and not “optimize.” The opinions that are cited
are likely to be the opinions the judge encounters first, and as a practical matter, this means that they are likely to be the opinions that
result from traditional research methods. For example, a Westlaw
search will produce a list of opinions in reverse chronological order.
Each opinion that deals with the issue will cite other authority, and
the recently cited authorities are highly likely to be cited in the
newly written opinion. Importantly, judges are highly likely to cite
authority that is already widely cited. If a particular authority is
cited in the cases returned by the research process, there is an increased probability that the judge will cite that authority. And the
more judges that cite the authority, the greater the likelihood that it
will garner further citations.
Choi and Gulati continue their exposition, explicitly connecting citation rate with quality:
Indeed, the particular nature of the products (that they are free)
means not only that competition is likely to occur effectively, but
that we should be able to see clear and outright winners of the
tournament. All judges will cite the best opinions. And to the extent certain “superstar” judges tend to write the best opinions,
other judges will repeatedly look to these judges for guidance in
the future. After all, given that the opinions all cost the same
amount of money (zero), why not only use the best ones (even if the
next best is only slightly worse)? This phenomenon of superstar
judges does highlight one possible market defect: to the extent that
most judges do not receive a large return from writing good opinions, many will not have an incentive to do so. All things considered, though, we predict that the reporting of objective ratings will
raise the likelihood that more judges will exert effort to become a
superstar judge (given the high payoff from winning the tournament).30

But Choi and Gulati’s claim—that all judges will cite the best opinions—is clearly false once we look at citation through the lens of

30. Choi & Gulati, Tournament, supra note 1, at 307 (emphasis added).
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networking theory. In the language of network economics,31 we can
call this a process of “preferential attachment.”32 Opinions that are
well situated in the network of citations will be cited many times;
opinions that are more obscurely situated in the network will be cited
rarely or not at all. The result is the so-called “‘rich get richer’ phenomenon.”33 Opinions that are initially cited for a proposition will be
cited over and over for that same proposition.
In other words, the citation rate of a given opinion (and hence of
the author judge) will depend in large part on the position of the
opinion in the ecology of the network of authority. The first opinion
to state a given proposition will be likely to generate many citations.
Subsequent opinions will be more likely to be cited if they are the
most recent opinion stating the proposition; the time that a given
opinion remains at the top of the stack (the first position in the recency queue) will depend on the average frequency with which the
proposition is stated at the time the opinion is issued. If the opinion
of Judge C stating proposition X is at the top of the stack at a time
when Judges D, E, and F are all working on opinions that also will
state proposition X, then it is likely that Judge C’s opinion will be
cited three times. But if Judge D states the proposition after Judge C
and after Judges E and F have already finished researching their
opinions, then Judge D’s opinion may never be cited at all. Moreover,
once Judge C’s opinion has been cited by Judges D, E, and F, then it
becomes highly likely that these judges will repeat their citations to
Judge C’s opinion in future opinions. The repetition of the citation in
their opinions increases the likelihood that other judges will cite
Judge C’s opinion for the proposition. Occupying a very favorable
node (or position in the ecology of the citations network) can result in
an extraordinary number of citations; occupation of an unfavorable
node can result in no citations at all. The important thing is that
these differences can occur even though the proposition stated is exactly the same. For this reason, citation rates do not necessarily
track quality.
But this understates the problem with citation rates as a proxy for
judicial excellence. Given the ecology of citation networks, it seems
quite likely that frequency of citation will be a function of originality.
The first case to state a proposition is, all else being equal, highly
likely to become an important node in the citation network. Whereas
31. I am greatly indebted to Tom Smith for his conversations with me on this point.
See Thomas A. Smith, The Web of Law (Jan. 3, 2005) (unpublished manuscript), available
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=642863.
32. Boris Galitsky & Mark Levene, On the Economy of Web Links: Simulating the Exchange Process, FIRST MONDAY (Jan. 5, 2004), at http://www.firstmonday.org/issues/issue9_1/galitsky/index.html
(discussing preferential attachment in the context of hyperlinks on the World Wide Web).
33. See id. (discussing the rich-get-richer phenomenon in terms of hyperlinks).
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judges must choose between many opinions when choosing authority
for an oft-repeated proposition of law, they only have one choice
when selecting authority for a novel proposition of law instantiated
in only a single prior opinion. But it is hardly clear that novelty
makes for good law or that originality is a judicial virtue. This is not
to say that originality is never appropriate, but a truly virtuous judge
will only be original when the law itself requires originality.
Indeed, I have argued that the opposite is true under normal conditions. The excellent judge is a nomimos, who follows the law rather
than makes it. Good judges are clever in using the resources within
existing law to solve the legal problems that come before them. The
very best judges are experts at avoiding originality. And the very
worst judges may be the most original. Very bad judges may use the
cases that come before them as vehicles for changing the law, transforming the rules laid down into the rules that they prefer. This kind
of results-oriented or legislative judging may produce many original
propositions of law and hence a high citation rate, but this is a measure of judicial vice and not judicial virtue.
This is not to say that a high citation rate is necessarily an indicator of judicial vice. There are hard cases, in which some important issue of law comes before a court for the first time. Some judges may
have high citation rates because the luck of the draw has handed
them a disproportionate share of cases with truly new legal questions. But even if this is so, it does not follow that these are the best
judges. Luck is not virtue.
2. Productivity and Carefulness
What about productivity? Choi and Gulati suggest that a tournament of judges should include a productivity measure:
The selection of a Supreme Court justice, therefore, should involve
a prediction about the effort that a circuit judge is going to exert if
elevated. Objective factors could focus on the effort that she exerted while she was a circuit judge. We could look at how many
opinions (versus short form dispositions) the judge published, how
many concurring and dissenting opinions she wrote, how many
opinions she wrote in which she took on primary responsibilities
(as opposed to delegating to clerks), and the overall number of
cases which she played a role in deciding during a given period of
time.34

But are the judges who write the most or longest opinions the best
judges? Choi and Gulati have argued that short opinions are actually
an indicator of judicial excellence, because shortness is a proxy for
34. Choi & Gulati, Tournament, supra note 1, at 309-10 (footnote omitted).
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judges writing their own opinions as opposed to delegating that task
to clerks.35 If total number of pages is not a good proxy for diligence,
then what about the number of opinions written? It is certainly possible that the number of opinions written per time period is a proxy
for judicial excellence, but this is not necessarily the case. The number of opinions written is surely a function of the number of opinions
assigned. Assigning judges may attempt to equalize workloads; this
might result in a judge who is given a difficult writing assignment
being assigned fewer opinions. Or assigning judges might seek to
equalize the number of writing assignments. The question whether
there is a relationship between number of opinions written and judicial excellence seems to depend on a variety of empirical questions
and not to be well suited for armchair speculation.
3. Fame Versus Excellence
There is a more general problem with Choi and Gulati’s approach
to measuring judicial excellence. The judges who are cited most and
who write the most opinions may well be the judges who want to be
famous, or at least “almost famous.” Fame and glory (or external recognition) are powerful motivators, but it is not clear that a desire for
fame is a virtue for judges. Indeed, the claim that excellent judges
seek fame and glory seems somewhat counterintuitive.
There is nothing wrong with a desire for external recognition;
humans as social creatures may naturally desire recognition by their
fellows. But an excessive desire for fame is likely to be inconsistent
with judicial virtue. The virtue of justice—the central component of
judicial excellence—requires that judges aim at giving litigants what
they are due, that to which they are entitled by the rules laid down.
To the extent that judges decide cases on the basis of a desire for the
fame and glory that come with winning a tournament of judges, they
risk departing from the actions required by the virtue of justice; to
put it more bluntly, a tournament of judges may create incentives to
do injustice in order to win. Justice may require a prosaic opinion
that says nothing likely to garner oodles of citations. Winning the
tournament of judges may encourage a more dramatic opinion that
makes new law in order to garner attention.
C. Gaming the Tournament of Judges
If there were a tournament of judges that influenced the selection
of Supreme Court Justices, we may confidently predict that some
judges would play to win. That is, they would view the tournament
35. Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, Which Judges Write Their Opinions (And
Should We Care)?, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1077 (2005).
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as a tournament and devise strategies to maximize their chance of
success. How might such a judge game the tournament of judges?36
To simplify, let’s assume the tournament is scored by a formula
which includes the following three measures:
• Citations by lower courts, academics, and the Supreme Court.37
• Productivity, including the number of majority and dissenting
opinions written and the number of cases in which the judge participated.38
• Judicial independence, or the frequency with which the judge is in
opposition to another judge selected by the same President (or a
President from the same political party).39
Let’s also assume that the judicial selection tournament will be
viewed by both participants and third parties as a game, with payoffs
determined by the selection of Supreme Court Justices. Judges who
are selected would receive a large positive payoff, but other players
(Presidents, Senators, judges, academics, and law clerks) would also
receive payoffs—if judges whose ideology they shared became Supreme Court Justices. This assumption, that judges would play to
win, is shared by Choi and Gulati: “Our proposal also recognizes that
judges, like the rest of us, respond to incentives.”40 So how would the
judges respond to the incentives? How might the game be played?
1. Gaming the Productivity Measure
Choi and Gulati propose that we measure the number of opinions
and dissents as well as the number of cases in which judges participate. How could this measure be gamed? Tournament leaders will
wish to maximize the number of opinions and dissents. If not assigned an opinion, a judge will have a strong incentive to dissent. If
two politically aligned judges sit on the same panel and one of the
two is a tournament leader while the other is not, there will be a
strong incentive to hand the opinion to the leader. Circuits determine
their own procedures for case assignments. A circuit with a tournament leader who is politically aligned with the Chief Judge and the
majority of the judges on the circuit will have a strong incentive to
provide more opinion-writing opportunities to the leader. This will
advantage judges in friendly circuits and disadvantage judges in unfriendly circuits. In the long run, however, there are only so many
36. This portion of the Essay draws on a post from Legal Theory Blog. See Lawrence B.
Solum, A Tournament for Judges. Mad? Brilliant? Clever?, LEGAL THEORY BLOG (Apr. 17,
2003), http://lsolum.blogspot.com/archives/2003_04_01_lsolum_archive.html#200162580.
37. Choi & Gulati, Tournament, supra note 1, at 305-09.
38. Id. at 309-10.
39. Id. at 310.
40. Id. at 305.
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ways to game productivity. Presumably, equilibrium will be reached
among the judges who are tournament leaders—with each scoring in
approximately the same range on this measure.
2. Gaming the Citation Frequency Measure
The opportunities for gaming this measure are obvious. Academics will now have an incentive to cite their favorites to influence
tournament results. Likewise with both lower court judges and Supreme Court Justices. A set of second-order tactics will be likely to
emerge. The composition of law school faculties can be influenced by
state legislatures and by the wealthy alumni of private universities.
The lower federal court benches are selected by the President and the
Senate. Moreover, judges themselves can change their opinion writing so as to maximize the opportunities for both citing other judges
(allies in the tournament) and for being cited. Opinions will become
longer and long string cites will become the rule. Basic and uncontroversial issues will be discussed in depth. When faced with a choice
between writing an opinion on an issue where there is no law—
because the issue arises infrequently—and an issue on which there is
a lot of law—because the issue comes up all the time—the rational
tournament participant will avoid the former and seek the latter.
Perhaps the most successful tactic for gaming the citation frequency measure is also the most problematic. Judges will have an incentive to change the law, because an opinion that makes new law—
especially new law on a topic that arises frequently—is much more
likely to be cited than an opinion that merely restates existing law.
3. Gaming the Judicial Independence Measure
Choi and Gulati propose that we measure independence by voting
records.41 Judges would score points for voting against a judge appointed by a President of the same party as appointed that judge.
There are several ways to game this measure. The most obvious way
is to dissent when a same-party judge is in the majority and the decision would otherwise be unanimous. And, by the way, the judge trying to win the tournament will also write a long, citable dissent that
rehearses all of the basic law surrounding the case and cites all the
judge’s allies in the tournament. Of course, there will be cases in
which the players cannot decide contrary to party affiliation without
changing the outcome. But if you are a tournament leader and the
case is not on a hot-button issue about which you care deeply, it may
well be in your interest to score some independence points by decid-

41. Id. at 310.
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ing the case in a way you believe is wrong—and by writing a long
opinion, of course!
4. Gaming Clerk Selection
Getting really good clerks is going to be very important in the
tournament of judges. If you want to be a tournament leader, you
will need to write a lot of very long opinions and dissents. Moreover,
you need high-quality opinions, because they are more likely to be
cited by other judges. So you want the best clerks. Supreme Court
Justices can influence who gets the best clerks by informally signaling that some judges are “feeder judges.” Clerks will want those
clerkships, because they will lead to prestigious Supreme Court
clerkships, which in turn will lead to prestigious academic positions,
creating the opportunity to influence both citations and future clerks.
The advantage added by the very best clerks is likely to be substantial, and may well be decisive, given that citation frequency is the
one measure among the three where an equilibrium ceiling is unlikely to be established by the players. With great clerks, a stable of
externs, and some high-quality politicking, it might be possible for a
judge to garner many thousands of citations.
D. The Costs of a Gamed Tournament
In their original article, Choi and Gulati suggested that the tournament of judges could be accompanied by a ban on discussion of any
other merit-based criteria for judicial selection other than the tournament results.42 When it comes time to select Supreme Court Justices, the tournament results will be the only information that Presidents and Senators may use to justify their decision—other than political ideology. Assume that the tournament does, in fact, determine
who is appointed to the Supreme Court. What price would we pay?
1. Damage to the Rule of Law
One thing that is very difficult to measure objectively is whether a
judge has decided in accord with the law—rather than on the basis of
either ideology or to gain an advantage in the tournament. The virtue of justice is not rewarded in the tournament. No points are assigned for getting the law right. Moreover, too high a regard for justice is likely to be punished. Judges who vote based on the merits will
lose opportunities to write opinions and dissents. Judges who agonize
about getting it right will be diverting precious time from the oppor42. See id. at 313 (“To address the problem of political transparency, an extreme form
of the tournament would be one that bars the president and the Senate from putting forth
merit-related rationales outside our list of objective factors.”).
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tunity to score points by getting it long, that is, producing lots of long
and citable opinions. And judges who get it right are unlikely to produce opinions with lots of novel propositions of law—and hence lots
of citations.
2. The Exclusion of Soft Variables
Practical wisdom, or phronesis, is a key component of judicial excellence, but the tournament of judges does not award points to
judges who have common sense, which is the ability to size up a
situation and penetrate to the issues that are truly important. Indeed, the judges who possess this virtue are likely to be rather weak
performers in the tournament of judges. They are likely to perceive
that scoring points at the expense of doing justice is a rather poor excuse for judging. They are likely to lag behind their more canny and
competitive colleagues.
3. Decreased Transparency
Choi and Gulati claim transparency as an advantage for the tournament of judges,43 but the opposite may be the result of their proposal. The tournament is likely to create an illusion of objectivity.
Behind the scenes, however, there would be manipulation of opinion
counts, citation counts, and independent decision counts. This will
especially be true if one party controlled the Presidency, the Senate,
the Supreme Court, and a majority of court of appeals slots at the
beginning of the tournament. That party would have enormous strategic advantages in gaming the tournament, but the political nature
of the selection process would effectively be masked by the apparently neutral and objective basis that the tournament results would
provide for the selection of Supreme Court Justices.
4. A Crisis
The end result of Choi and Gulati’s proposal would be so awful
that one cannot imagine the story ending except in some kind of crisis. You may not like the current Supreme Court, but imagine a court
populated by judges who had won Choi and Gulati’s tournament.
These judges would be without the virtues of integrity, wisdom, or
justice. They would have been selected for the ability to manipulate
the tournament results. In order to do this, the winning judges would
be those who are willing to elevate self-interest over the interests of
the public and the parties who appear before them. And these clever
but vicious judges would be entrusted with the ultimate constitutional authority.
43. Id.
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V. CONCLUSION: THE REDEMPTION OF SPECTACULAR FAILURE
If viewed as a serious proposal for reform of the judicial selection
process, Choi and Gulati have a spectacularly bad idea—a real
stinker. This can be true even if the retroactive application of Choi
and Gulati’s selection criteria identifies excellent judges. The reason
for this is obvious. No one had an incentive to game Choi and Gulati’s
hypothetical tournament. The participants could not predict that the
tournament would exist, and even if they knew that two law professors were conducting a hypothetical tournament, they would have
very little incentive to play to win. All of this would change if the
tournament of judges were actually implemented. Choi and Gulati
recognize the imperfections of their measures of excellence and offer
the following defense:
We will never succeed in generating a perfect objective measure
of judicial quality. The point, however, is not whether objective criteria perform better than a perfect system of judicial selection.
Rather, the question is whether objective criteria work better than
the selection process we have today. Given how politicized the selection of Supreme Court justices currently is, the use of any objective factors will lead to a marked improvement.44

But this argument fails on two counts. First, it is not necessarily the
case that the use of objective factors would lead to a “marked improvement” in a gamed tournament. Such a tournament would select
for those who are motivated by a desire to win the tournament and
not by those who want to do justice. Choi and Gulati assume that the
tournament will reduce the role of political ideology, but in a gamed
tournament, that assumption is doubtful. Second, the reform of the
judicial selection process—like most reform processes—is likely to
involve path dependency and opportunity costs. If political capital
were invested in a tournament of judges and we start down the road
of judicial selection based on objective measurement of outputs, then
it may become more difficult to focus on true judicial excellence. If
the tournament of judges favors one ideological faction over another,
the winning faction will have every incentive to preserve the tournament. The opportunity cost of a real-world tournament of judges
could well be loss of the chance for the implementation of real meritbased judicial selection.
Sometimes, however, bad ideas spark good debates. We can view
Choi and Gulati’s tournament of judges as a thought experiment
rather than a proposal for reform. As a thought experiment, the
tournament of judges is a marvel, precisely because it invites rigorous analysis of the judicial selection process. In the end, Choi and
44. Id. at 312.
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Gulati’s tournament of judges invites us to ask two questions: What
constitutes judicial excellence? and How can we select judges who
possess them? Those questions are worth answering.

